Ownership structure and CEO remuneration: do independent directors matter?

Purpose ? This study aims to investigate the influence of ownership structure on chief executive officer (CEO) remuneration in an empirical manner. This paper also targets to explore the moderating effect of independent directors. Design/methodology/approach ? This research uses a sample of 67 non-financial firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange between 2015 and 2020. The analysis uses the ordinary least squares regression method. Furthermore, it incorporates the two-stage least squares method and the generalised method of moments technique to address endogeneity issues. Similarly, a dynamic model is applied to tackle causality-related concerns in the study?s equations. Consequently, the study conducts thorough data analyses, ensuring robust findings. Findings ? The outcomes show that ownership structure has an influence on CEOremuneration.Moreover, the results indicate that independent directors moderate the association between ownership structure and CEOremuneration. These findings enhance and support the agency theory in the Jordanian context. Practical implications ? The study?s findings may help investors, regulators and scholars comprehend the practices of CEOremuneration in Jordan. Originality/value ? This investigation provides a unique understanding by explaining the impact of ownership structure on CEOremuneration, in addition to the role of independent directors in a developing nation like Jordan. Besides that, the current paper extends past studies in Jordan significantly